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Wolfgang Balzer 
EXCHANGE VERSUS INFLUENCE: 
A CASE OF IDEALIZATION 
ABSTRACT. The intertheoretical relation between economic equilibrium 
theory and a theory of social institutions is studied in reduced Form, i.e. by 
comparing the central primitives rather than the full formal models. It is shown 
that equilibrium can be regarded as a limit of institutions with ever more 
symmetrical power relations. Economic equilibrium theory thus is shown to be 
an idealization of the theory of social institutions. A provisionary topology which 
gives substance to  the notion of a limit is defined "internally", i.e. by reference 
to items occurring in the models only. The meta-scientific status of idealization 
is briefly discussed. 
Some famous authors have held that an adequate account of social 
phenomena can be given only by a combined approach including 
economics, sociology, psychology, and hist0ry.l This idea certainly is 
compelling; everyone having worked with a theory applicable to social 
systems will have felt that some part or aspect of the real situation could 
be better understood from the point of view of a different theory. It then 
seems natural to try combining different theories in order to improve the 
scientific picture of the situation. The problem, however, is that we have 
no clear ideas what it means to "combine" different theories from 
different disciplines to form a "joint picture" of the real phenomenon. 
There is a "problem of joint application". Vague notions of comple- 
mentarity occur here and then, also the notion of a caricature has been 
used to describe the issue. We are certainly not in a position to make 
general claims about how different theories can, or do, work together in 
modelling real systems more adequately, simply because there are very 
few cases in which such combination was attempted, and because in such 
attempts the "theories" involved were very vague.2 
I am indebted to Bert Hamminga for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1 The view is explicit, for instance, in Braudel (1980), it is clearly implicit in Marx's 
work. 
Like in Marx. 
In this paper I want to approach the problem by studying the 
borderline between economics and sociology. Here is a clear cut case in 
which the economic idealization of a free market clashes with the real 
existence of institutions aiming at the distortion of that market. It seems 
to me that this situation is typical for the relation between disciplines of 
the above list. By studying it more closely we therefore may hope to get 
a better understanding of how different theories in the social domain 
relate to each other and to reality. Intuitively, the relation in the case 
mentioned seems to be one of idealization or concretization: if the 
idealizations defining a free market are taken back, and the economic 
theory in this way is concretized, we arrive at a more comprehensive 
theory including institutions and market-like phenomena. A question 
arising naturally in that context is whether this case fits Nowak's 
conceptual account of ideali~ation.~ 
Of course, there is little sense in talking about the whole disciplines of 
economics and of sociology; these are bodies of knowledge too compre- 
hensive in order to describe real phenomena. From a meta-theoretic 
point of view4 real phenomena or real systems are described or modelled 
by scientific theories. So we have to find two theories dealing with 
systems of the kind of markets and institutions. In economics there is no 
problem of finding a rather generally accepted theory about ideal 
markets, which in its various different forms is called equilibrium theory. 
As I will not go into the full details of any of its axiomatizations here, it is 
not necessary to pick one particular exposition. Any reader may think of 
his or her favorite v e r ~ i o n . ~  On the other hand, there is at the moment 
no theory of institutions on which sociologists would agree in a similar 
way. In sociology, the leading paradigm among formally trained scientists 
is game t h e ~ r y . ~  However, no empirical application of a game theoretic 
model to a real life social institution has been achieved up to now.7 
Moreover, it can be argued that game theory misses, and even 
contradicts to, a basic feature of institutions which consists in the change 
of the opponent's payoff-function. While game theory assumes that the 
Expositions are found in Nowak (1980), see also Hamminga (1989). 
4 My personal meta-theory is of course the structuralist view of theories which, I think, 
is the most sophisticated general approach to  the structure and development of theories. 
See Balzer, Moulines, Sneed (1987). 
5 Arrow & Hahn (1971), Debreu (1972), Haendler (1979), Hildenbrand (1974). 
In particular, there is the claim that social institutions can be understood as 
supergames. See Taylor (1976) for the technical notions. 
7 There are of course numerous abstract "applications" of the game theoretic 
apparatus to  abstract classes of situations being defined by certain characteristic payoff 
functions. But by "empirical application" I mean the full-fledged confrontation of a model 
with empirical data gathered from a concrete situation. 
payoff functions are given, the theory of institutions assumes that 
individuals try to change their opponents' payoff  function^.^ Therefore I 
prefer a theory of social institutions which I have developed m y ~ e l f , ~  and 
I will take this theory as the sociological "counterpart" to equilibrium 
theory. The more narrow aim then is to study the relation between 
general equilibrium theory and that particular theory of social institu- 
tions in order to see what the relation of idealization amounts to in this 
case. 
The result may be summarized by three propositions. First, the case 
indeed exemplifies the central feature of idealization, namely that we 
come from one theory to the other by means of abstraction. We come 
from institutions to markets by abstracting from certain features present 
in institutions which in fact prevent free exchange. Second, we even can 
point out some internal criteria - criteria formulated purely in terms of 
the theories' vocabulary - for idealization, and for the degree in which 
idealization is present. Third, however, there are doubts whether 
Nowak's conceptual model of idealization is general enough to treat 
cases of this kind in a natural way. 
1. Preparations 
The initial image of the situation is this. We know that real markets are 
biased by all kinds of regulations imposed by political and other institu- 
tions. Because of this, real markets are neither free nor competitive.1° 
On the other hand, we believe we can imagine various such regulations of 
different strength, and we can imagine that by eliminating the strongest 
distortion, and then step by step other, less important ones, the system 
will approach a free market. In other words: if we make more and more 
idealizing assumptions about a real exchange system we will approach 
a free market, a model of equilibrium theory. 
In order to obtain a more substantial account we have to look more 
closely at the two theories modelling the system "before" and "after" the 
idealizations have been made. If we assume that all important distortions 
are imposed on the system by social institutions, we may take the system 
in its non-idealized form as a model of the theory of institutions. The 
(counterfactual) idealized system on the other hand clearly is a model of 
equilibrium theory. For reasons of space it is not possible to present 
See Balzer (1992a) for details. 
Balzer (1990). 
lo In the last two decades this insight found expression in an internal economic 
approach, the "new institutionhl economics". See Bardhan (1989) for a brief account. 
these two theories here in full detail. Rather, I will pursue the following 
strategy. I will concentrate on one central primitive of each theory, and 
see how these primitives relate to each other. By indicating informally 
their central role in the respective theory, and by assuming that "other 
parts" of the models are not essentially affected by the changes 
considered the comparison is thus "reduced" to the study of these two 
primitives. Without offering a full-fledged formal analysis I claim that the 
result obtained by this "reduced" approach will also be obtained when 
the full models of both theories are taken into account. 
At the side of equilibrium theory I concentrate on the notion of 
exchange which, informally, lies at the heart of equilibrium theory. 
Ironically, this notion does not function as a primitive in the usual 
axiomatizations. It may be easily introduced, however. Let us consider a 
primitive of the following format: 
to be read: "individual i exchanges with individual j commodity a against 
commodity by'. a and b are interpreted as tokens whose description 
includes the kind of good as well as the quantity. This notion is closely 
linked to that of endowment. If we know the endowments of all 
individuals before the exchange, and if we have complete knowledge of 
the exchange-predicate then the endowment after the exchange is 
uniquely determined. Also, from the exchange-predicate both endow- 
ments, before and after, may be determined, provided we know the 
"rest", i.e. those quantities which the individuals keep in their possession 
without exchange. This shows that the predicate really is fundamental for 
equilibrium theory. If it were not for reasons of simple mathematical 
formalism it might have easily entered into existing expositions. To the 
observational basis provided by endowments or exchange equilibrium 
theory adds the notion of utility or preference, as well as that of 
equilibrium plus the well known assumptions of maximization, convexity 
of preferences, and clearing of markets. 
At the sociological side more explanation would be necessary. One 
main primitive of the theory of institutions is the notion of power which 
is used in the following format 
to be read: "individual i by performing action a exerts power over 
individual j so that j performs action b". Again, a and b are tokens, that 
is, concrete actions in their historical uniqueness. This mode of actually 
exerting power has to be distinguished from the disposition of having 
power which can be understood in terms of exerting power (to have 
power is to be able to exert power under suitable conditionsll), and from 
the means of power which are objects, roles or institutions enabling the 
dominant agent i to exert power.12 
Very roughly, a social institution is modelled as a hierarchy of 
macroscopic groups among which a status relation is established in terms 
of individual exertions of power. Roughly, group g has higher status than 
group g' if almost all members of g exert power over suitable members of 
g' but not vice versa. A stronger kind of connection is obtained by 
requiring that almost all members of g' are affected in such power 
relations, i.e. for nearly every member i of g' there is some member of g 
exerting power over i. Thus on the macroscopic level, an institution 
consists (among other things) of a structure 
cG, st>,  
where 
1) G is a set of groups 
2) s t is a binary relation on G 
3) s t is transitive13 and 
4) there exists a group g in G which has highest status. 
Further parts of the model, like the superstructures which contain those 
parts of the intellectual representations relevant for the institution, and 
the social practises which capture the origin and development of the 
different types of actions in terms of which the groups are characterized, 
cannot be described here in detail.14 
What is important here is to see the way in which social institutions 
function. An institution may be regarded as a kind of crystallized web of 
power relations among individuals which is stabilized in the interest of 
the unique group having highest status in the institution. As certain 
power relations are favourable for members of this group, the members 
are interested in having these relations legitimized and stabilized. Once 
this is achieved, and the institution is established, we may well see how 
these power relations also function as obstacles for competitive 
exchange. A group with high or highest status may be able to introduce 
all kinds of regulations which yield some extra benefit for members of 
l 1  This leads to the analysis of counterfactuals which is not seen problematic to-day. 
See, for instance, Lewis (1973). 
lZ Compare Wartenberg (1990) for an up to date account of power. 
l3 I deviate in this point from Balzer (1990), where the status relation is taken to be 
anti-reflexive. Anti-reflexivity in the full theory enforces asymmetries which are not 
compatible with the picture of equilibrium we have in exchange. If exchange is to become a 
"special case" of an institution this requirement therefore has to be weakened. 
l4 More details in Balzer (1990). 
this group. If this group is not itself engaged in business it will impose 
taxes or the like, if it is a group actively trading itself, it will try to protect 
its business against members of other groups. All kinds of taxes, 
subsidies, and institutional regulations and prescriptions in modern 
states may be seen in this way as favoring some politically more powerful 
group - i.e. a group the members of which can exert power over many 
members of other groups - at the cost of other groups. This description 
should be sufficient to stress the fundamental role of the above notion of 
power in the theory of social institutions. 
2. Comparison 
I will now try to compare the two theories in a "reduced" way by 
comparison of the two primitives: exchange and power. These notions are 
well suited for comparison. They have the same numbers of arguments, 
and two of their arguments may be taken to be the same on both sides in 
a straighforward way. The notion of an individual or a person is the same 
both in equilibrium theory and in the theory of institutions. So "i" and 
"j" in the above expressions may be taken to denote the same kind of 
entities in both predicates. 
What about "a" and "b"? In equilibrium theory these denote 
commodity tokens, in institution theory they refer to actions. Is there a 
big ontological difference between commodities and actions? Certainly, 
under suitable circumstances, actions may pass for commodities. I may 
prefer action a to action b, or action a may have some utility for me. 
Conversely, it would seem odd to say that commodities are a kind of 
actions. But there is no invincible obstacle between the two. With a 
slight, and natural step of additional interpretation we may come from 
commodities to actions. The use of any commodity is in its consumption, 
and its potential use in its potential consumption or its potential to 
improve c o n s ~ m p t i o n . ~ ~  In the present context we may well pass over 
from a commodity to the action of its being consumed. Under this 
reinterpretation, commodities may be "translated" into corresponding 
actions. But it is not necessary to agree on this global ontological 
embedding. As already stated, equilibrium theory may be rephrased such 
15 Obviously, we are not discussing deep philosophical or moral issues here. The 
context is an empirical theory about certain kinds of social systems and the way of 
individuals' behavior in such systems. Even if some persons may attach value to things like 
rules, truth or beauty, this does not provide a serious argument against the transition 
proposed, for such phenomena will very likely be eliminated in the course of the 
approximate application of empirical theories of the kind discussed. 
that it talks about exchange and non-exchanged possessions instead of 
the usual endowments. Now exchange of commodities clearly may be 
described in terms of actions. Instead of saying that i and j exchange a for 
b, we may as well say that i performs the action "i hands over commodity 
a to j" and that j performs the action "j hands over commodity b to i". Of 
course "a" and "b" still must be verbally described, but their description 
usually will not contain the expression "commodity". It is natural to 
regard each exchange as a pair of two actions, and for this reason we may 
- in the present context - neglect the ontological difference and take 
the "commodities" in exchange as really being the actions performed in 
the exchange. Under this construal the ontology of both predicates, 
exchange and power, is the same. Writing 
E for the set of action tokens which may be, or are, performed in a 
system, and 
J for the set of actors present in the system, 
exchange as well aspower is a subset of J x E x J x E. It has to be stressed 
that the notion of action is very comprehensive, and may be applied to 
such vast enterprises like the building up of an army or the sacking of a 
town. Thus we can say that i, the king, say, by building up an army exerts 
power over his neighbour-king to make him pay tribute. 
If the ontology is the same for both predicates, where is the 
difference? We have to explain what we mean by exertion of power in 
order to see the difference. In the theory of institutions exertion of 
power has three features.16 Let me call any quadruple <i, a ,  j, b> for 
which it holds that power(i, a ,  j, b)  a power event. First, and rather 
trivially, the two actions a ,  b occurring in a power event have to be 
actually performed. If this were not the case we could not say that power 
is exerted. Second, action b has to be caused by action a at least partially 
from the point of view of one of the actors i or j. If there were no partial 
causation, both agents would say that b simply happened to be performed 
some time after a but without any connection. Third, and most 
importantly, agent j originally does not intend to perform the action b. 
Thus we arrive at the following characterization of power (which is not 
meant as a definition but as an ordinary axiom). 
power(i, a ,  j, b)  iff 
( 1 )  i performs a and j performs b 
(2) i or j believes that a is a partial cause of b 
(3) i intends that j should do b while j does not intend to do b. 
l6 Compare Balzer (1990) and Balzer (1992b) for details. 
To make this more precise, we may imagine the power event as 
comprising two instants. In the first instant, action a is performed by 
person i, and at some later time action b is performed by person j. Now 
the crucial condition is that originally, i.e. at the time when a is 
performed by i, j does not intend to do b. Thus the fact that j later 
actually performs b points to some internal change on j's side. j may have 
come to change her intentions so that, at the later time, j also intends to 
do b. But sometimes this is not so: j performs b eventhough she does not 
intend to do b. Informally, we may say that exertion of power has to 
overcome some resistance on j's side.17 Here is a clear difference 
between exchange and power. In exchange, both actors intend to perform 
their actions, in exertion of power actor j (which may be called the 
subordinate actor while i is called the superordinate actor) does not 
intend to perform his action, at least originally he does not. This 
difference, once stated, must not be overemphasized. The degree of 
resistance is variable and may become arbitrarily small. On the other 
hand, being as small as we like, it still marks a difference. To see this, 
consider a possible objection18 pointing out that in exchange also some 
resistance is overcome. The offered price being large finally overcomes 
the partner's "resistance" to sell. Under the usual idealizing assumptions 
of equilibrium theory this way of describing the situation is not 
satisfactory, though. The usual analysis would run as follows. The 
rational, potential seller, j, for each fixed pricep knows whether selling at 
p increases his utility or not. If not, the seller does not intend to sell at 
the given price, and in the meaning of the term as used above resists the 
exchange. If, on the other hand,p is high enough, the person intends to 
sell, and the exchange takes place. Similar considerations apply to the 
potential buyer, i, and the particular price she offers. She will intend to 
exchange only if the price is below some fixed bound known to her. 
Looking at the situation in this way "to overcome j's resistance" means 
to make a new, better offer which means to perform a new, different 
action. By the original action a of offering a price p too low, i does not 
overcome j's "resistance", and no action takes place on j's side. So there 
is no exertion of power. By the different action a '  of offering a price high 
enough, on the other hand, no resistance needs to be overcome, so again 
there is no exertion of power. 
Consider the spectrum of English verbs reaching from begging at the 
one end via asking, proposing, to exchanging in the middle, and via 
requiring, demanding to ordering at the other end. The order inherent in 
17 This feature has been recognized long ago, see for instance Weber (1980), p. 28. 
l8 I am indebted to B. Hamminga in this point. 
this list corresponds to a similar order of the actor's status with respect 
to the other person, the addressee. To beg means to speak from the 
lowest lewel, to ask for something still indicates an inferior position. In 
exchanging both persons are at the same level. The person who demands 
or orders is in a superior position with respect to the addressee. There 
are certainly other expressions falling into that spectrum unknown to me 
because of my poor English. Systematically, and independently of the 
particular language, the general situation may be depicted as in figure 1. 
i order 
f 
j obey 
Fig. 1. 
At the opposite sides of the circle we have on any line through its 
centre two persons i and j interacting with each other. If the cor- 
responding line is horizontal the interaction is an exchange, if it is 
vertical the interaction is an exertion of power of the person "on top" 
over the person "on bottom". Between these two extreme positions there 
are infinitely many intermediary positions each being abstractly given by 
some specific angle a. If a ranges from zero to 900 the corresponding 
interaction changes from pure exchange to pure exertion of power. 
We also interpret the picture as showing just different degrees of 
exertion of power each degree being given by angle a. Power is exerted in 
the highest possible degree if a = 90°. When a decreases power becomes 
less articulated. In this interpretation exchange becomes a special case of 
exertion of power. It is the mildest form of power, a form in which both 
agents are practically equal. This special case is approached "in the 
limit", namely when a goes to zero. 
At the institution's side this limit really involves two features. First, 
we may look at the degree of resistance which has to be overcome on the 
subordinate's side. In the above characterization ofpower, condition (3) 
says that j does not intend to do b, but condition (1) states that b, is 
performed by j. Now the higher j's intention not to do b the greater is j's 
resistance, and the more power is exercised over j by i, if j actually 
performs b. A second feature is that when going to the limit the relation 
between the two actors becomes more symmetrical. The subordinate 
agent also develops an intention to the effect that the superordinate 
agent should do "his" action a, and also there is growing belief among 
the two that action b partially causes action a. In the limit when there is 
no resistance at all but an intention also on j's side and when there are 
symmetric causal beliefs the situation is perfectly symmetric. In a power 
relation which is close to exchange i's action a also may be described by 
saying that i hands over some good to j, and j's action b accordingly by 
saying that j hands over some good to i. 
Extending this relation to the two full theories we should say that 
equilibrium theory is not only a special case of the theory of institutions, 
but even is a limit case of the latter. On the macroscopic part of an 
institution, going to the limit amounts to changing the hierarchical 
structure <G, s t> in a way in which the status relation becomes 
"weaker". The status relation between two groups is "defined" in terms 
of the individual exertions of power among their members. When these 
power relations approach exchange they become more symmetric as just 
described, and thus the "difference" or "distance" in status vanishes. In 
the limit, status differences disappear, the groups have "equal" status in 
the sense of neither group being higher or lower in status than any other, 
and thus in a certain sense the groups "merge" into one big group (the 
set of economic agents). 
3. Internal criteria of distance 
These considerations indicate that it is not only possible to imagine a 
transition from an institution to an equilibrium exchange system but also 
to find criteria of how far the institution is away from the "economic 
limit" of a model of equilibrium theory. It seems possible to state the 
degree in which an institution differs from equilibrium in rather 
operational terms which even may give rise to a quantitative notion of 
distance. 
Consider a system of agents and actions involved in power relations of 
a social institution. As before, agents are denoted by variables i, j and 
actions by variables a, b. For r ( 4 let us say that x occurs in the r-th 
position of the power relation iff there exist xl, x2, x3 such that x, x l ,  x2, x3 
form a complete instantiation of the power predicate, and x occurs in 
position number r of this instantiation. Consider the four projections of 
the power predicate 
SUPERORDINATES (power). the set of actors occurring in the first 
position of power 
SUBORDINATES (power) = the set of actors occurring in the 
third position of power 
ORDERS (power) = the set of actions occurring in the 
second position of power 
OBEDIENCES (power) = the set of actions occurring in the 
fourth position of power. 
If the system is close to an exchange model the first two sets should be 
similar in the sense of having a similar number of members, and the same 
should hold for the last two sets. For in exchange the "exertion of power" 
inherent in the superordinate's action a is.balanced by an "exertion of 
power" inherent in the subordinate's action b. Whenever i exerts power 
over j in the weak sense of exchange, and thus i is in SUPER- 
ORDINATES (power) and j in SUBORDINATES (power), it is also the 
case that j exerts power over i in this weak sense, and thus j is in 
SUPERORDINATES (power) and i in SUBORDINATES (power). We 
may take the difference in number of members of both sets as a first 
component of a measure of difference or distance between power and 
exchange. If the difference is great, i.e. if there are many more persons in 
SUBORDINATES (power) than in SUPERORDINATES (power), then 
power is far away from exchange. It is clear that such a difference cannot 
be expected between ORDERS (power) and OBEDIENCES (power) 
because every action of ordering usually has its counterpart of obedience 
and vice versa. So these two sets will be similar in number also for the 
power relation. There is, however, a second component of the distance 
measure. In institutions the "upper" groups have relatively few members, 
but their members exert power over many members of the "lower" 
groups. Thus the power relation in a "normal" institution - where there 
is a strong status hierarchy - exemplifies a big difference in the number 
of members of SUPERORDINATES (power) and SUBORDINATES 
(power), as already pointed out. On the other hand the numbers of 
ORDERS (power) and OBEDIENCES (power) are the same or similar. 
So few superordinate agents perform many orders, and many sub- 
ordinate agents each perform an obedient action. This means that - on 
the average - each superordinate agent performs many different actions 
of ordering while every subordinate agent performs few actions of 
obedience - at least much less than a superordinate agent's orders. So 
the difference in numbers of elements of the sets ORDERS (power) and 
SUPERORDINATES (power) also yields some indication of how far the 
power relation is away from exchange. The larger this difference, the 
more orders are performed by each superordinate agent, the stronger the 
power structure, and the more distant is the system from exchange. 
We may define a first, admittedly rough, measure of distance of a 
power relation from exchange by the sum of these two differences. 
Perhaps this is not the ultimate word on comparing the two notions. The 
point however is that it is defined in purely instrinsic terms; it refers to 
the power relation and to nothing else. 
I t  may be objected that this picture of asymmetries is not in 
accordance with democratic states which certainly should be included in 
the analysis of institutions. The objection would point to the fact that in a 
democracy each voter exerts power over members of the ruling group by 
voting. Here the second feature of my analysis of power comes into play: 
the believed partial causation of action b by action a. Even if I would 
admit that the actors' beliefs are not so important so that what really 
counts are the "real" causal connections (whatever this means), the 
point is that in voting the causal connection is very partial - of the order 
of one to many millions, as we know. Given that all empirical theories 
apply only approximately such a small connection will be completely 
submerged in the blurs used to fit the data to a model. Therefore, the 
connection does not really count. To put it differently, and straight: on 
my analysis the voter in a large democracy does not exert power.19 
If we replace "power" in the definition of the above four sets by 
"exchange" we obtain four new sets which also may be used in the 
comparison. By summary the following propositions seem to spring 
from the previous discussion (where "similar" means "similar number of 
elements"). 
SUPERORDINATES (power) and SUBORDINATES (power) are 
not similar; 
SUPERORDINATES (exchange) and SUBORDINATES (exchange) 
are similar; 
ORDERS (power) and OBEDIENCES (power) are similar; 
l9 I admit that these brief remarks d o  not exhaust the issue of democratic institutions. 
There still is the possibility that the voters develop some joint intentions and joint beliefs, 
and exert power o n  this "joint" level. An analysis of this is certainly highly important, but 
still missing. Compare Tuomela (1992) and other work of Tuomela mentioned there for a 
sophisticated and fruitful approach to  joint intentions and beliefs. 
ORDERS (exchange) and OBEDIENCES (exchange) are similar; 
SUPERORDINATES (power) and ORDERS (power) are not similar. 
Of course, this is not a complete list. 
4. Idealization 
Going to the limit in a sequence of power relations which converges (in 
the sense induced by the distances just defined) to an exchange relation 
may well be rephrased by saying that abstractions or idealizations are 
made in the transitions at each step. My analysis has made precise which 
features are abstracted or idealized away. In the "real" systems - the 
institutions with their status hierachy - there are asymmetrical power 
relations. Asymmetry is present in the form of resistance on the 
subordinate's side, and in differences in the numbers of persons acting as 
superordinates and as subordinates. When we idealize these asymmetries 
we come to exchange. In realistic terms: when we counterfactually 
assume that there is no resistance of the subordinates where really is, and 
that there are equal numbers of agents on "both sides" where there 
really are not, then our system looks like a model of equilibrium theory. 
It is not a bold hypothesis to claim that equilibrium theory will turn 
out as an idealization of the theory of institutions. The essentials have 
been discussed. A model theoretic account involving the full models of 
both theories would not add much to the picture. 
The question however is not to evaluate whether such idealizations 
are useful or admissible. They occur in all branches of science, 
prominently in physics, and therefore may well be taken as legitimate 
scientific procedures. The meta-theoretic question is about the general 
structure of idealization, and of the role of idealization in science. I want 
to close with brief comments on both points. 
The general structure of idealization was first modelled by N~wak,~O 
his account has stimulated much of the present work on the subject. His 
model is formulated in terms of transitions of axioms from one stage to 
the next where the axioms in the less idealized stage contain some non- 
zero parameters the convergence of which to zero indicates that the 
idealized stage is approached. Application of the model to a concrete 
case thus presupposes that those features which are "idealized away" will 
be expressible in the theory by means of a number. The situation in our 
example seems favorable. We managed to define some numerical 
- 
20 Nowak (1980). 
measure of "distance from exchange" which in principle can be made a 
part of the theory of institutions. 
But such a procedure does not seem to be very natural. Intuitively, the 
measure of distance is not a part of any of the two theories. It is - and 
was introduced - only as a means for comparing them. A more natural 
account of idealization would leave this measure external and describe 
the transition to the limit by means of a converging sequence of models. 
This idea may be worked out along the lines formally proposed by 
D. M a ~ r . ~ '  The general situation which is exemplified by the case before 
us is that Nowak's model grasps what is basic to idealization but at the 
cost of using a rather restrictive formalism which may be improved in the 
way indicated. 
As regards the role of idealization in science I have two remarks.22 
First, we speak of an idealization only when we have some idea of which 
features exactly are neglected in the idealized picture. If we assume that 
scientists are clever enough to include all features they think are relevant 
into their models, we are forced to conclude that idealization can only be 
detected when a better theory has occurred. Only when we know better 
we may point out the deficiencies of the idealized theory. This view is 
confirmed by the development of the natural sciences. Second, 
materialists will tend to understand idealization as leaving out of 
consideration some of the true features of the system. Since we have no 
other access to truth than by our best theories the postulate of an 
independent reality is strongly metaphysical and does not seem to have 
many defenders now.23 Both remarks point to the role of the notion of 
idealization as a means of becoming aware of, and to "measure", 
scientific progress, and I take this as its main role. 
Wolfgang Balzer 
Institut fur Statistik und Wissenschaftstheorie 
Universitat Miinchen 
Ludwigstr. 31 
80539 Munchen 
FRG 
21 Mayr (1981). 
22 I admit that these remarks are based more on the history of the natural sciences than 
on that of economy. Hoover's contribution to this volume provides a somewhat different 
view which seems to  prevail in econometrics. However, the issue cannot - and should not 
- be settled in the present state because this will require a precise explication of 
idealization which includes the process of confrontation of data and model (and thus the 
process of parameter estimation). 
z3 Of course, the premiss in this sentence is also metaphysical, but "it's" metaphysics is 
more advanced than materialism. 
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